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I. Introduction
The courtroom fell silent as Abel Blackmar, a New York State Supreme Court judge,
presented his conclusive findings on the Montauk Tribe’s lawsuit. The year was 1910 and the
Montauk Tribe argued that its traditional lands in eastern Long Island, New York were acquired,
by the industrialist Arthur Benson, through illegal transactions made in the late nineteenth
century and early twentieth century (Rose and Rose 2015:61). While the court case was based
upon these land claims, Blackmar’s final judgment revealed that it was predominantly a contest
over the tribe’s identity, questioning whether the Montauk people were truly American Indians in
the first place. In an instant, the tribe’s identity was judged and framed. To the shock of the
Montauks within the courtroom, Blackmar announced the tribe’s extinction. According to
Blackmar, the tribe had disintegrated as a result of assimilation with the local non-Indian
populace. The tribe lacked both an internal government and a distinctive community. Presumed
mixed-blood due to intermarriage with African Americans further delegitimized the tribe’s
identity as American Indian (Strong 1992). Culturally, socially, racially, and politically, the tribe
did not meet the ideal standards of a distinctive American Indian identity. The legal statement of
extinction sealed the tribe’s fate; suddenly, the tribe and its members were rendered invisible.
The present-day Montaukket Indian Nation continues to live in a state of invisibility haunted by
Blackmar’s century-old declaration. This invisibility only reinforces questions on the tribe’s
authenticity. Without federal recognition, tribes, including the Montaukket Indian Nation, have
difficulty responding to challenges over their legitimacy as American Indians.
Federal recognition acts as a badge of authenticity for American Indian tribes. Since the
1970s, legislation has increasingly employed the definition of American Indian as one who is
enrolled in a federally-recognized tribe (Brownell 2001:281). For example, a religious ceremony
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involving eagle feathers or peyote may be illegal for non-federally recognized tribes who aren’t
protected under the American Indian Religious Freedom Act of 1978 (Dadigan 2011). Likewise,
the Indian Arts and Crafts Act of 1990 states that it is illegal to sell arts and crafts advertised as
American Indian made, or as authentically indigenous, unless the artisan belongs to a federallyrecognized or state-recognized tribe (or if the individual is certified as an Indian artisan by a
recognized tribe) (Castile 1996:745). Lastly, the Native American Graves Protection and
Repatriation Act of 1990 allows federally-recognized tribes to protect sacred sites and demand
the repatriation of cultural artifacts and burial remains. In most cases, non-federally recognized
tribes are unable to successfully demand the repatriation of its ancestral remains through the act
(Barker 2013; Talbert 2012). Such legislation promotes the illegitimacy of non-federally
recognized tribes—contributing to their invisibility—while establishing federal recognition as
the standard of an authentic tribal identity. Fundamentally, attaining federal recognition is about
attaining legitimacy as a people.
Identification as American Indian is never freely asserted or given, but must be
continuously proven. As stated by George Pierre Castile, “Indians have become the only cardcarrying ethnic group in America and now must be able to produce their papers on demand”
(Castile 1996:745). In order to prove and verify their identity (i.e. to become federally
recognized), non-federally recognized tribes must measure up to the regulations established by
the federal government in the Federal Acknowledgment Process (FAP). Within this formal
process, tribes are judged through “externally imposed definitions of Indianness and tribal
existence enforced by the government officials who evaluate and decide whether to grant federal
recognition” (Den Ouden and O’Brien 2013:5). In a sense, non-federally recognized tribes are
put on trial—judged from criteria employed by outsiders—as in the Montauk case.
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In this thesis, I argue that the Federal Acknowledgment Process demands that nonfederally recognized tribes appear as “liminal” entities. The phrase “liminal” is defined as a
status or state in which one is “betwixt and between” two categories, two identities, or two social
statuses, but is neither one nor the other. In order to become federally recognized, tribes
petitioning through the Federal Acknowledgment Process are compelled to provide a substantial
amount of evidence proving that they are: culturally and socially distinctive—recognizably
different from American society—while also remaining intelligible (most often, politically
intelligible) to the federal government. As in the Montauk trial, tribes should appear as nonassimilated—close interaction with American society serves to delegitimize a tribe’s
“Indianness”. However, there is a limit to recognizing difference. Tribes must also be politically
organized under western standards of governance—tribal governments predominantly formed
around a written constitution with democratically elected leaders filling bureaucratic positions.
In other words, petitioning tribes must simultaneously exist in a mythical past, uncontaminated
and isolated from western influence, and in the present, acclimated to and engaged in western
standards of legality and governance.
In this juridical process, difference or distinctiveness and similarity or intelligibility are
posed as opposites, yet the federal government demands that tribes fit both categories
simultaneously. Difference and similarity pull the tribes in opposite directions, stretching them
across time and space—existing partially in the past as exotic, and partially in the present as
familiar. Unable to fully fit either category (betwixt and between both difference and similarity),
the liminal identity cannot be adequately maintained. As tribes present their distinctiveness, they
may be viewed as too different from American society—most significantly from western
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expectations and standards of political governance; when tribes appear too similar or assimilated
to American society, they do not appear different enough from the nation-state.
In order to demonstrate the nature of this imposed liminality within the Federal
Acknowledgment Process, I will begin by briefly reviewing the concept of liminality before
detailing the manner in which American Indian identity has been construed historically and how
these depictions connect to the construction of a liminal identity that non-federally recognized
tribes must meet—between difference and similarity; between past and present. These
arguments are framed by Elizabeth Povinelli’s theory of recognition among Aboriginal
Australians. While Povinelli primarily focuses on recognition in terms of authentic cultural
difference (and the failure, if not the impossibility, to measure up to these standards), I place an
equal emphasis on the inherent limitations of recognizing difference—that those being
recognized must also be intelligible or minimally assimilated to the nation-state. After
correlating Povinelli’s ideas to non-federally recognized American Indian tribes, I will further
detail the nature of federal recognition, its history, including an overview of the Federal
Acknowledgment Process itself. Afterwards, I will briefly reflect on the biases of historical
documentation that petitioning tribes confront while pursuing recognition and the possibility of
imagining alternative conceptions of identity outside of the juridical process. In the final
sections of the thesis, I will detail the struggles of two non-federally recognized tribes pursuing
recognition: The Muwekma Ohlone Tribe (of California) and the United Houma Nation (of
Louisiana). I will outline the history of both tribes followed by an analysis of the federal
government’s response to their petitions for federal recognition. Through these two case studies,
the imposition of a liminal identity will be revealed as well as how that identity, more often than
not, fails to be maintained.
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II. Introducing Liminality
Liminality, deriving from the Latin word “limen”, or threshold, was first discussed by
Arnold van Gennep in relation to the structure and process of ceremonial rites of passage. Van
Gennep noted that rites of passage (e.g. puberty, graduation, marriage, etc.) entail a change in
one’s social status. In order to attain this new status, an individual must abandon or separate
from his or her current social status. The liminal period marks the state when an individual has
separated from his or her previous social status, but has not yet reintegrated and readjusted to his
or her new social status. This transitionary state exists “betwixt and between” both statuses, but
is neither one nor the other.
Expanding upon the concept of liminality, the anthropologist Victor Turner noted that
certain individuals or groups may be considered liminal beings as a condition of their very
existence (Turner 1969). A shaman, who mediates between the sacred world and the profane
world, may be viewed as a liminal person. Thus developed, the concept of liminality can apply
to other circumstances beyond rites of passage. It is possible to talk of people and groups subject
to legal processes as liminal beings. While waiting for the court’s decision, the accused is not
guilty, yet not innocent; alternatively, a tribe within the Federal Acknowledgment Process is not
yet recognized, but also not yet denied from being recognized. Tribes that petition for
recognition do indeed stand at the “threshold” of recognition as they await judgment.
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III. The Imposition of Identity
1. Creating the “Other”
In 1976, one non-federally recognized tribe stood at the threshold of recognition, not as
part of the Federal Acknowledgment Process, but in a court case over land claims and tribal
identity. The Mashpee Wampanoag Tribe sued the town of Mashpee, Massachusetts in an
attempt to reclaim tribal lands (about three-quarters of the town of Mashpee) that were taken
illegally, according to the Indian Non-intercourse Act of 1790—forbidding state transactions
with Indian tribes without congressional approval (Clifford 1988:277). The primary question
that developed during the trial, similar to the 1910 Montauk court case, was whether the
Mashpee Tribe was truly an Indian tribe today and continuously an Indian tribe throughout
history. The jury determined that the Mashpee people did not consistently constitute an Indian
tribe; only around 1834 and 1842 did the jury admit that the tribe existed (ibid.:335). The tribe
shifted in and out of existence—revealing “people who were sometimes separate and ‘Indian,’
sometimes assimilated and ‘American’…Indians in Mashpee lived and acted between cultures in
a series of ad hoc engagements” (ibid.:342). In reflecting upon the court’s decision, James
Clifford muses that “only a few basic stories are told, over and over, about Native Americans and
other ‘tribal’ peoples. These societies are always either dying or surviving, assimilating or
resisting. Caught between a local past and a global future, they either hold on to their
separateness or ‘enter the modern world’” (ibid.:342). In other words, American Indian
identities appear to be situated in a liminal state, juxtaposed between a mythic and timeless past
and the assimilative present, whether in court or in the Federal Acknowledgment Process.
One of the most long-standing and prevailing ideas on American Indian people is the
inevitability of their extinction, through genocide or through assimilation into Euro-American
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civilization. American Indian identity was first constructed in opposition to Enlightenmentderived ideas of universal reason, progress, and modernity. American Indians were perceived as
the antithesis of European morality and reason: as depraved, childlike, belligerent, primitive,
impoverished, irrational, and so on. In quoting the words of Edward Said, Dan Gunter states that
“the American Indian has provided European Americans with ‘one of [their] deepest and most
recurring images of the Other’” (Gunter 1998:100). Due to this imagined opposition, EuroAmericans felt it was their duty and burden to civilize the natives. Euro-Americans justified the
coercive acquisition of native lands and the destruction of native cultures and peoples in the
name of this civilizing project. The destruction was reframed as the necessary transformation of
natives from their state of savagery into the Euro-American state of civilization (Perry 1995:571;
Dennison 2014:1-2). The natives who were “saved” by becoming civilized merely lost their
authenticity as natives. Indian identities were and continue to be constructed as timeless,
embedded in an imagined, mythical past prior to European contact. Thus, “by creating an image
that was ‘uncivilized’ by European standards, the immigrant Americans were able to define away
any Native Americans who adopted white culture” (McCulloch and Wilkins 1995:366). Change
and acculturation marked and continues to mark the end of an authentic American Indian identity
(Miller 2003:53).
This circumstance parallels Johannes Fabian’s discussion and critique of how
anthropology categorizes and describes the societies and cultures that it studies. According to
Fabian, the subject under study, the “other”, is relegated to another time separate from the
modern world that the anthropologist exists within. From this allochronic discourse, the “other”
is constructed by the static, immutable, and seemingly objective representations postulated by the
anthropologist. Fabian refers to this separation of time, the anthropologist in the present and the
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“other” in the timeless past, within ethnographic description as the denial of coevalness (Fabian
1983). This constitutes the refusal in permitting American Indians to enter the modern world
without first discarding their identity as American Indians.
Furthermore, the categorization of the “other”, existing in another time, is a matter of
control and intelligibility. The native “other” exists as a relational concept (Miller 2003:56),
only constructed in opposition, that promotes Euro-American authority and hegemony. As stated
by James C. Scott, John Tehranian, and Jeremy Mathias, people and places must be evaluated
and defined in the language of the colonizers in order to effectively rule over the “other”—“In
the case of colonial rule, when the conquerors speak an entirely different language, the
unintelligibility of the vernacular landscape is a nearly insurmountable obstacle to effective rule.
Renaming much of the landscape therefore is an essential step of imperial rule” (Scott,
Tehranian, and Mathias 2002:5-6). American Indian people have become legible through the
impositions and regularities of Indian identity constructed and utilized by Euro-Americans
(Gunter 1998:103).
2. The Cunning of Recognition
If nineteenth century liberalism, deriving from the progressive ideas of the
Enlightenment, encouraged colonization and the destruction of native culture and people (Mehta
1999); then, twentieth and twenty-first century multicultural liberalism, organized around
cultural diversity and tolerance, leads to the strict regulation of indigenous identities, requiring
those identities to be both socially and culturally distinct from the nation-state (the U.S. or
elsewhere) as well as intelligible through the language and standards of the nation-state. This is,
indeed, the premise of Elizabeth Povinelli’s argument in The Cunning of Recognition.
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Povinelli focuses on the demands of authenticity placed on Aboriginal Australian
identities, specifically for making aboriginal land claims. In order to be recognized (for these
land claims), indigenous Australians must express their cultural distinctiveness from the
Australian nation-state—“to identify with a lost indeterminable object—indeed, to be the
melancholic subject of traditions” (Povinelli 2002:39). They must identify with a traditional past
that is structured around ancient ways of life that precede the existence of the Australian state.
The impossibility of existing in some “other time” while living in the modern nation-state,
involved in land claims with the Australian government, suggests that the modern juridical
examination for an authentic identity “always already constitutes indigenous persons as failures
of indigeneity as such” (ibid.:39). Past idealizations of indigenous Australians can never be fully
represented in the present-day. Ancient practices and meanings transform through time—they
are presented in “whatever language and moral frameworks prevail at the time of enunciation”
(ibid.:55). Therefore, “every determinate content of Aboriginal culture—every propositional
content—forecloses the imaginary fullness of ancient law. Every time indigenous subjects
provide content to their traditional practices, they do so in present time—linguistic time—and
this marks their alteration by history” (ibid.:55). The question of assimilation creeps in as the
alluring magic of ancient rituals becomes too intelligible, too understandable to non-native
Australians. The expression of cultural difference from the nation-state in the present seems to
inherently limit the possibility of fully recognizing such difference. The mere existence of
indigenous Australians in the present already hinders their authenticity. A news article detailing
the life of one native Australian, referred to by Povinelli, informs the reader that “this last real
Larrakia is really no different than the average Australian (white) citizen” with ordinary pastimes
such as watching Days of Our Lives (ibid.:59).

9

Povinelli also points towards another limitation in the recognition of cultural difference—
rituals that are too different from western standards, deemed as morally repugnant. Under
national and international standards of human rights, certain practices such as genital mutilation
are unacceptable in the celebration and recognition of cultural difference (ibid.:24). Overall, the
recognition of an authentic native identity is threatened on both ends—by the suspicion that
indigenous people have lost their ancient traditions and exist in the present as assimilated to nonnative society and by the concern that certain rituals are too different from western standards of
morality.
3. Between Us and Them
These dual limitations are likewise present in the Federal Acknowledgment Process.
This “technology of regulation” (Gunter 1998:90) seems to depend upon “how many Aboriginal
traits the petitioning tribe retains in common with the mythic notion of ‘Indian or ‘tribe’”
(McCulloch and Wilkins 1995:368). In attempting to meet the high standards of “Indianness”,
several tribes have adopted the attire of traditional Plains Indian cultures, most notably the
headdress, in order to make their presence known (Miller 2003:83). Others have indicated that
traditional Plains Indian culture, of chiefly authority, headdresses, and a spiritual connection with
the land, has become the generic basis of a (pan-) Indian identity (Hanson 1997). In most cases,
petitioning tribes emphasize their own unique history in order to demonstrate their isolation from
and non-assimilation to American society. However, this attempt to meet the regulations of a
distinctive tribal identity jeopardizes that identity as being perceived as too different—culturally,
socially, or politically—from the expectations of the federal government. This directly
corresponds to Povinelli’s notion of repugnance.
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The recognition of difference is tempered by the necessity that such recognition is
intelligible to western standards of identity—most significantly, western standards of political
governance. An “ideal” tribe emerges through the recognition process (Paschal 1991:224)—one
that maintains its isolation from American society, but is also intelligible and organized around
western standards of formal political authority (Gunter 1998). As I will discuss in more detail
later, a proper and legally legible tribal government derives from the Indian Reorganization Act
(IRA) of 1934. The act solidified the concept of federal recognition alongside the reorganization
of tribal governments. These new tribal governments formalized around written constitutions,
democratically elected leaders in bureaucratic positions usually involving a tribal council
fulfilling roles similar to Congress and a tribal chairman/chairwoman or chief akin to the
President. This style of governance does not directly correspond to the diverse forms of
traditional governance used by American Indian tribes (these traditional forms may, in turn,
appear too different and unintelligible within the recognition process). Non-federally recognized
tribes tend to reorganize their government to match the IRA-style of governance prior to
pursuing recognition. The creation of these new westernized governments suggests that
petitioning tribes are, at least minimally, integrated or assimilated into American society. Bruce
G. Miller reflects on the seemingly incongruous recognition of native peoples based upon their
historical assimilation when claiming that, “Indigenous communities, in some cases, are simply
unable to meet the legal thresholds imposed but, ironically, could potentially do so if their
ancestors had quickly acquiesced to demands of white authorities; assimilated; developed
centralized, hierarchical governance; and begun written recordkeeping in the nineteenth century”
(Miller 2003:44).
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Overall, petitioning tribes within the federal recognition process must provide proof that
they predate Euro-American influence while being organized as “quasi-European entities”
(Gunter 1998:122). The tension of being culturally distinct and different from American society
and being intelligible and assimilated to American society entails the basis of the liminal identity
imposed upon tribes in the Federal Acknowledgment Process. Miller has alluded to the tension
of this liminality by stating that, “there remains the problem that if tribal people voluntarily
participated in the state programs soon after contact, they now run the risk of appearing impure
and assimilated. On the other hand, if they failed to cooperate with the intruding society, they
now suffer from the failure to be administratively noticed and eligible for inclusion among other
indigenes” (Miller 2003:212). To put it another way: at times, a petitioning tribe must appear as
a unicorn inhabiting a mythical past; at other times, a petitioning tribe must discard its horn and
appear as an ordinary horse living in the present. Since the two are juxtaposed in time, it appears
contradictory for the federal government to mandate that a tribe be both simultaneously.
It may be said that the federal recognition process produces a “double-bind” based upon
that contradiction. The phrase derives from Jessica Cattelino’s description of tribal sovereignty
among the Seminole Tribe of Florida. Cattelino states that the double-bind operates in this
manner:
“American Indian tribal nations (like other polities) require economic resources to
exercise sovereignty, and their revenues often derive from their governmental
rights; however, once they exercise economic power, the legitimacy of tribal
sovereignty and citizenship is challenged in law, public culture, and everyday
interactions within settler society” (Cattelino 2010:235-236).
In the recognition process, this correlates to the demand that petitioning tribes provide evidence
as to their (cultural/social) distinctiveness and (political) intelligibility. As tribes present their
distinctiveness, they may fail to appear as fully intelligible. When tribes are fully intelligible to
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western expectations, they may fail to appear as distinctive enough from American society. The
expression of one category of their imposed, bifurcated identity limits the opposing category.
The uncertainty and indeterminacy of this “betwixt and between” status has been
similarly perceived by Thomas Biolsi in his discussion of federal Indian law. Biolsi states that
there is an ongoing tension between recognizing the special rights of native people (as
fundamentally different from the nation-state) and subsuming native people within the full
jurisdiction of the U.S. (as fundamentally integrated and assimilated into the nation-state). He
goes on to claim that federal Indian law is based upon this contradiction—it “has the seeds of its
dissolution within its own discursive terms” (Biolsi 2001:14). Likewise, within the Federal
Acknowledgment Process, the demand that tribes appear as liminal beings already establishes the
failure to recognize these tribes.
Clifford did claim that only a few stories about American Indians are told over and over
again—the mythical past and the assimilative present. The Federal Acknowledgment Process is
the stage through which these stories are performed; the platform through which a liminal
identity is constructed and deconstructed.

Unlike Fabian’s depiction, the inspected tribe is not

solely placed in some “other time” but also in the present-day. The past and the present
simultaneously exist as an anachronistic fantasy always on the verge of collapsing. Through this
anachronistic fantasy, the question “what was it like back then (before white settlers)?” suddenly
becomes sensible to those inspecting the authenticity of modern indigenous people, even if only
for a moment (Povinelli 2002:64). The imposition of a liminal identity leads petitioning tribes to
appear as more or less distinctive and more or less assimilated; or as more or less in the past and
more or less in the present. Like a game of tug of war, the liminal identity under inspection is
stretched apart—as one side begins to pull and prove that the tribal identity is distinct, the other
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side, of intelligibility or assimilation, fails to be evinced, and vice versa. Perhaps the only
winning move is not to play. For many non-federally tribes, however, this is hardly a sufficient
option. Attaining federal recognition is an imperative goal for these forgotten tribes.

IV. Recognizing (Non-) Recognition
1. “Those Whom Even Time Forgot”: Non-Federally Recognized Tribes and Federal
Recognition
In order to demonstrate the imperative nature of federal recognition for non-federally
recognized tribes, it would be useful to begin by detailing the meaning and value of federal
recognition. After defining and discussing federal recognition and the non-federally recognized
tribes who seek it, the development of recognition, into its specific legal usage, will be traced
through time—from 1778, when the first treaties were made between tribes and the United
States, to 1978, when the Federal Acknowledgment Process was formally established.
Following an overview of the Federal Acknowledgment Process itself, I will briefly discuss the
inherent biases in historical documentation that often claim that petitioning tribes are already
extinct. This section will conclude with some thoughts on the possibility of imagining
alternative tribal identities separate from the claims of extinction or the imposition of liminality
in the recognition process.
Federal recognition entails the government-to-government relationship between the U.S.
and a tribal entity. Through this special relationship, the U.S. acknowledges a tribe’s inherent
rights of sovereignty—rights which the federal government has a responsibility to protect.
Beside the right to form their own government, tribes are able to make and enforce laws, tax
their populace, establish and determine rules for tribal membership, license and regulate
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activities within their jurisdiction, and so on. Federally recognized tribes are also entitled to
certain federal services and protections. Currently, there are 567 federally recognized tribes.
The exact number of non-federally recognized tribes is not known. According to Russell
Thornton’s analysis of the 1990 census, only 60% of those identifying as American Indian
belonged to a federally recognized tribe (Thornton 1997:38). The other 40% does not
necessarily reflect the total amount of individuals belonging to non-federally recognized tribes,
but rather to individuals self-identifying as American Indian. Other scholars have pointed out
that between 1960 and 1990, the number of American Indians documented through the census
more than tripled; a growth that cannot solely be explained by an increase in the birth rate and a
decrease in the death rate, but rather by a new ethnic consciousness and pride (arising from the
civil rights movement) encouraging individuals to claim or reclaim their American Indian
ancestry (Nagel 1995). In recognition politics, the rise of individuals self-identifying as
American Indian has led to concerns over the possibility that petitioning tribes are fake,
“wannabe” tribes (with no documentable Indian ancestry and stereotypical views on native
culture), classified as “Indian descendant recruitment organizations” attempting to take
advantage of the special benefits and services reserved for recognized tribes—a situation
described by one scholar as the “Southeast Syndrome” (Quinn 1990a). Such anxieties over
authenticity have been used to justify the strict regulations within the Federal Acknowledgment
Process (Miller 2004:69); regulations which will be analyzed later on.
In 2012, the U.S. Government Accountability Office (previously known as the General
Accounting Office) (GAO) released a report detailing the limited amount of federal funding
provided to non-federally recognized tribes. The GAO identified the existence of around 400
non-federally recognized tribes (U.S. GAO 2012). Compared to the 567 federally recognized
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tribes, this is a substantial amount of tribes that continue to exist without legal recognition. How
did so many tribes become non-recognized? In many cases, “these tribes were too peaceful to
present a military threat, too small or isolated to be noticed, or simply possessed nothing that the
United States and its citizens desired to have” (Anderson 1978:7). Thus, the federal government
never bothered establishing a relationship with such tribes. In other cases, certain tribes,
particularly in the eastern U.S., only signed treaties with colonial governments prior to the
establishment of the United States or as in California, the treaties made with the U.S. were never
ratified by Congress (the circumstance of the Muwekma Ohlone Tribe, to be discussed later)
(Riley 2014:452). Lastly, tribes may have strategically avoided detection as Indians, purposely
obscuring their own identity, by migrating to isolated, barren, and uncultivated areas in order to
elude federal officials and avoid coercive, assimilative, and genocidal Indian policies. For
example, the United Houma Nation, to be examined later, traveled south to the secluded swamps
and bayous in Louisiana to resist the removal policies that resulted in the Trail of Tears. Another
strategy included hiding in plain sight by outwardly adopting European culture and intermarrying
with the surrounding non-Indian society while secretly maintaining tribal traditions (Porter
1979). Due to this strategy, American Indians are often misidentified in census records as
mulatto, mixed-blood, white, or black; a circumstance which the federal government, ironically,
perceives as assimilation into American culture and society and the abandonment of an Indian
identity (Mather 2003:1830).
As mentioned previously, federal recognition bestows sovereign rights and federal
services to these once forgotten tribes. These benefits provide a large incentive in pursuing
federal recognition. Most notably, the U.S. government provides economic support in the form
of federal loans, as well as an array of programs and services including health care, housing
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assistance, and economic development opportunities (Gonzales and Evans 2013:42). The federal
government also provides educational assistance in the form of scholarships and grants to
members of federally recognized tribes (Mather 2003:1834). Federal funding can play a
significant role in the maintenance and development of a tribal community given the high rates
of poverty among American Indian tribes. The 2000 census indicated that American Indians
have the highest rates of poverty out of any ethnic group. Furthermore, a report published by the
Department of Labor stated that, in 1997, 50% of American Indians in the labor force were
unemployed, although this rate has improved due to the success of tribal gaming operations
(Cramer 2005:52). The situation, however, is even worse for non-federally recognized tribes.
For example, 80% of the members of the Mowa Choctaw Indians, according to the 2000 census,
were below the poverty level (ibid.:54). Attaining federal recognition would ameliorate these
dire circumstances.
An equally significant reason for pursuing recognition is to have legal confirmation of a
tribe’s authenticity—“an unquestionable, determined, and once-and-for-all autochthonous,
Indian, status: an external validation for their own traditional knowledge. Many want a legal
status that enables them to fight local, state, and national doubts about their ‘authenticity,’ their
‘genuineness’ as Indians.” (Blu 2001:73). Claims of tribal extinction can finally be countered by
obtaining federal recognition. Centuries of invisibility may abruptly come to an end.
Prior to recognition, however, a state and status of invisibility proceeds into a state and
status of liminality within the Federal Acknowledgment Process. This formal process was
established in 1978. Since then, the Office of Federal Acknowledgment (OFA) (originally called
the Branch of Acknowledgment and Research) within the Office of the Assistant Secretary –
Indian Affairs (AS-IA) of the Department of the Interior (DOI) have concluded and decided
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upon 51 cases. Of those 51 petitions for federal recognition, 18 tribes passed the regulations and
attained federal recognition; the other 33 tribes were denied federal recognition. In other words,
about 65% of tribes do not meet the regulations of the acknowledgment process. Arguably, the
failure rate would be even higher if it counted the large number of tribes who have not yet
submitted a full petition that the OFA deemed ready for active consideration. Over 350 tribes
have sent a letter of intent to petition for federal recognition, less than 100 tribes have completed
a full petition (Coronado 2016:551). There are also the tribes who haven’t bothered to petition in
the first place after realizing that they would be unable meet the strict criteria employed in the
process or the financial burdens necessary to conduct research for a full petition (Myers
2001:275). As stated by the anthropologist Jack Campisi, non-federally recognized tribes face
high standards of evidence that even many federally recognized tribes would be unable to meet
(Campisi 1991:58). The difference between the tribes who obtained federal status and those who
did not is “often an accident of history” (Blu 2001:72). How exactly did tribal recognition
develop from this accidental history into the formal and convoluted legal process established in
1978?
2. History of Recognition
Recognition was first utilized in a cognitive sense—“that federal officials simply ‘knew’
or ‘realized’ that an Indian tribe existed, as one would ‘recognize’, for example, the existence of
a large Irish population in Boston” (Quinn 1990b:333). The formal jurisdictional sense of the
term—the acknowledgment of tribal sovereignty within a special government-to-government
relationship—began to be more consistently used in the 1870s and was fully established,
superseding the cognitive sense of recognition, by 1934 through the passage of the Indian
Reorganization Act (ibid.:333-334). The earliest form of recognition was through treaty-making,
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from 1778 until its abolishment in 1871 (ibid.:339). However, there was no consistent definition
of Indian or Indian tribe used by all three branches of the federal government to indicate what
recognition entailed and what tribes qualified for it. The language of recognition inconsistently
referred to Indians “in amity with the United States”, “Indians not members of any of the states”,
“those whose lands were ‘secured by treaty with the United States’”, “friendly Indian tribes”, or
simply “the Indians” (ibid.:340-341). Chief Justice John Marshall stated in the 1831 Supreme
Court case, Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, that the relationship between Indian tribes and the
United States is peculiar. Indian tribes were not to be considered foreign entities, but as
“denominated domestic dependent nations”—like a ward to its guardian (ibid.:344). I would
argue that the phrase, “domestic dependent nations”, hints at the liminality imposed on American
Indian identities. It seems to state that Indian tribes are distinct from the United States, through
the implications of the word “nation” involving some socio-cultural and political sovereignty,
and alternatively, Indian tribes are integrated and within the jurisdiction of the United States,
through the words “domestic” and “dependent”. Acculturation is at odds with distinctiveness,
yet both categories are simultaneously involved.
American citizenship and tribal membership were often perceived as incompatible,
similarly at odds with each other, in the nineteenth century—“it was impossible for an Indian
who was a citizen, voted, and generally associated with non-Indians to be simultaneously
maintaining tribal relations” (Roth 2001:51). According to the 1884 Supreme Court case, Elk v.
Wilkins, Indians were not citizens of the United States; instead they belonged to their own tribe
with its own distinct political community (Quinn 1990b:349). This affirmation would be
reversed in 1924 through the Indian Citizenship Act, granting U.S. citizenship to all American
Indians. The bestowal of citizenship does not necessarily end the tension between an American
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identity and an Indian tribal identity. In the Brothertown Indian Nation’s petition for federal
recognition, the OFA interpreted the tribe’s U.S. citizenship among all of its members (including
the historical allotment of the tribe’s reservation to individual members) as an act of termination
ending the tribe’s sovereign status (Brown-Perez 2013:241).
Ultimately, the question over recognition was viewed as a temporary problem that would
inevitably be solved through cultural extinction. As tribes assimilated into the U.S. and
presumably became “civilized”, they would no longer be recognized as distinct social, cultural,
and political entities (Quinn 1990b:348). “Remnants” and “fragments” of tribes in the eastern
U.S. were understood as being subject to the laws of the state in which they resided as full
citizens (ibid.:353). In order to aid, encourage, and enforce this assimilation into the nationstate, the General Allotment Act, or Dawes Act of 1887 was passed. Through the act, tribal land
was divided into small portions of land, or allotments, granted to individual Indians. This land,
usually 160 acres per family, was held in trust by the federal government for 25 years or until the
Indian landowners were deemed competent enough to manage the land themselves. Federal
officials desired that Indians become self-reliant through the adoption of a sedentary, agricultural
lifestyle as well as individualistic with a motivation to accumulate property and wealth. In other
words, the act intended to civilize the Indians and integrate them into American society and the
capitalist market (Biolsi 1995). The surplus tribal lands that were not allotted to individual
Indians or Indian households were sold on the open market for American settlers. As a result of
the act, the total land base of Indian tribes dwindled from 138 million acres to around 52 million
acres by 1934 (McDonnell 1991:10).
While the act promoted the transition of tribal members to American citizens, the concept
of recognition was not fully formed and established. Parting from previous court decisions, the
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1901 court case Montoya v. United States stated that a tribe may be recognized but still not “in
amity with the United States”. This suggests that there still existed some ambiguity between
recognition in a cognitive sense and a jurisdictional sense. Notably, the Montoya case attempted
to define the criteria of a federally recognized tribe: “By a ‘tribe’ we understand a body of
Indians of the same or a similar race, united in a community under one leadership or government,
inhabiting a particular though sometimes ill-defined territory…” (quoted in Quinn 1990b:352).
This definition would serve as the precursor to the formal regulations of federal recognition
established in 1978.
Prior to the adoption of this formal, juridical process, the jurisdictional sense of
recognition needed to be formally solidified. This came about through the Indian Reorganization
Act (IRA) of 1934, which was initiated by John Collier—the commissioner for the Bureau of
Indian Affairs at the time. The IRA developed in response to the shortcomings of assimilative
policies such as the Allotment Act. In particular, Collier was concerned over the substantial loss
of tribal land, the continued impoverishment of Indian tribes, and the destruction of native
culture and tradition (Kelly 1975:291-292). The act ended allotment policies and encouraged
tribal self-governance—granting tribes more autonomy over their own affairs. Through the IRA,
tribes were able to reorganize under a new government structure. The tribes that adopted a
government through the act would be recognized for special federal services; likewise, the
federal government would have a responsibility to protect the sovereignty of these tribes (Cramer
2005:18). This special government-to-government relationship between the reorganized tribes
and the federal government explicitly and formally established the jurisdictional sense of
recognition. The act referred to all Indians who are members of any recognized Indian tribe now
under federal jurisdiction (Quinn 1990b:356). Over 200 tribes were eligible to reorganize under
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the IRA and thus, become federally recognized. Interestingly, certain tribes were intentionally
excluded. All of the tribes on the eastern seaboard were rejected as Collier perceived them to be
merely “folk groups” rather than authentic tribes (Spruhan 2006:32). The problem seemed to be
over assimilation and intermarriage with non-Indians. In another case, a tribe was rejected
because its members owned radios in their homes which suggested that the tribe was too
civilized to be legitimate Indians (Mather 2003:1831). Each tribe that was eligible voted on
whether to reorganize and adopt a new government through the IRA. Those that refused to
accept the government structure promoted through the IRA essentially became non-recognized
(Field 1999:198).
The IRA standardized the structure of government for Indian tribes. The organization of
IRA tribes derives from a written constitution, which is subject to review and approval by the
federal government (Resnik 1989:713), based upon western standards of political authority.
Unlike traditional forms of Indian political organization, IRA-style governments tend to involve
“a separation of church and state, representative (rather than participatory) democracy, and
separations of powers and functions of leadership” (Cramer 2005:60-61). As a result of the IRA,
the majority of federally recognized tribes today are organized through an IRA government
(Cramer 2005:20). In fact, almost 300 federally recognized tribes trace the origin of their
recognition to the IRA era (U.S. GAO 2001:21). Since the IRA formally established the
jurisdictional nature of federal recognition and standardized tribal governance among federally
recognized tribes, non-federally recognized tribes pursuing recognition must, in turn, measure up
to these standards of political governance. In other words, these tribes must be politically
intelligible to the federal government in order to become federally recognized.
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Although the concept of federal recognition was legally established through the IRA in
1934, there was no formal process to determine whether a tribe should be federally recognized.
Before 1978, the bestowal of federal recognition was handled on an ad hoc basis (Gonzales and
Evans 2013:38). The Cohen Criteria (from the Indian law scholar Felix Cohen) was used to
determine whether a tribe should be federally recognized. The criteria entailed that a tribe must
meet one of the following:
(1) That the group has had treaty relations with the United States;
(2) That the group has been denominated a tribe by act of Congress or Executive
order;
(3) That the group has been treated as having collective rights in tribal lands or
funds, even though not expressly designated a tribe;
(4) That the group has been treated as a tribe or band by other Indian tribes;
(5) That the group has exercised political authority over its members, through a
tribal council or other governmental forms (Cohen 1942:271).
Ethnological and historical evidence demonstrating a tribe’s existence was also used to make the
determination.
By the 1960s and 1970s—concurrent with the civil rights movement—there was a
proliferation of ethnic pride among American Indians. A new ethnic consciousness spurred
political activism over American Indian rights and tribal sovereignty. The period gave birth to
the American Indian Movement (AIM) which helped stage large-scale protests such as the Trail
of Broken Treaties and the occupation of Alcatraz Island while demanding tribal sovereignty
among all native nations (Cramer 2005:27-28). These demands were also taken up in court
across the country. In the west, treaty fishing rights were reaffirmed, even among certain nonrecognized tribes, in United States v. Washington (1974) (Miller 2004:35). In the east, two nonfederally recognized tribes, the Passamaquoddy and the Penobscot, demanded the return of their
tribal lands, equating to two-thirds of the state of Maine, while arguing that the state’s land
purchases were illegal due to the Indian Non-intercourse Act of 1790 (prohibiting states from
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purchasing Indian land without congressional approval) (ibid.:36). The court decision of Joint
Tribal Council of the Passamaquoddy Tribe v. Morton (1975) provided a ruling favoring the
tribes. The federal government allocated $81.5 million to the tribes for compensation and for use
in purchasing land.
The rise of Indian activism coupled with successful court decisions led to more and more
non-recognized tribes desiring the acquisition of federal recognition. The federal government
realized that, in order to handle the increasing amount of tribes pursuing federal recognition, a
formal process needed to be established (Quinn 1990b:362-363). This realization was also
influenced by the criticisms and recommendations made in the American Indian Policy Review
Commission’s (AIPRC) Final Report in 1977 regarding recognition and non-federally
recognized tribes. Within the report, the AIPRC condemned the treatment of non-federally
recognized tribes—“There is no legal basis for withholding general services from Indians, with
the sole exception of specific termination acts. There is no legitimate foundation for denying
Indian identification to any tribe or community. The BIA has no authority to refuse services to
any member of the Indian population” (AIPRC 1977:461). Ultimately, the AIPRC
recommended that uniform policies and criteria be adopted in order to facilitate the federal
recognition of tribes; ideally, the enacted policies would end non-recognition among all
American Indian tribes (ibid.:479-480). While the federal government could not live up to the
more idealistic demands of the AIPRC, they did respond in 1978 by establishing the Federal
Acknowledgment Process in which non-federally recognized tribes could petition for federal
recognition and become recognized or merely reaffirm their non-recognition.
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3. The Federal Acknowledgment Process
The Federal Acknowledgment Process requires a petitioning tribe to submit a sufficient
amount of evidence that proves the tribe’s political, ethnological, and genealogical continuity
from a historic tribe. As mentioned in the introduction, federal recognition acts as a badge of
authenticity—presumably only tribes that are truly native become recognized. By demanding
that tribes prove their identity through strict criteria, the Federal Acknowledgment Process
generates and imposes a high standard of authenticity over tribal identities. In this section, I
provide a brief overview of the Federal Acknowledgment Process and how this high standard of
authenticity is created and justified in the process.
Unlike the more flexible Cohen Criteria, the Federal Acknowledgment Process demands
that tribes meet all seven mandatory criteria (Riley 2014:455). The criteria, under the recent
revisions in 2015, require that:
(a) The petitioner has been identified as an American Indian entity on a
substantially continuous basis since 1900;
(b) The petitioner comprises a distinct community and demonstrates that it existed
as a community from 1900 until the present;
(c) The petitioner has maintained political influence or authority over its members
as an autonomous entity from 1900 until the present;
(d) The petitioner must provide a copy of the entity’s present governing
document, including its membership criteria; or in the absence of a governing
document, a written statement describing in full its membership criteria and
current governing procedures;
(e) The petitioner’s membership consists of individuals who descend from a
historical Indian tribe or from historical Indian tribes that combined and
functioned as a single autonomous political entity;
(f) The petitioner’s membership is composed principally of persons who are not
members of any federally recognized Indian tribe;
(g) Neither the petitioner nor its members are the subject of congressional
legislation that has expressly terminated or forbidden the Federal relationship
(U.S. DOI 2015:37889-37891).
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The most notable change from prior regulations is the evidentiary starting point of 1900.
Previous regulations extended the evidentiary burden by placing the starting date “from historical
times” (first sustained contact with non-Indians).
A tribe begins pursuing federal recognition by sending a letter of intent to petition. The
Office of Federal Acknowledgment (OFA) must respond to this letter by providing a written
notice of receipt within 30 days (Riley 2013:633). Then, the petitioning tribe focuses on
researching and drafting a petition that will meet all seven regulations for federal recognition.
Once the petition is submitted, the OFA conducts a preliminary review in order to provide the
petitioning tribe with technical assistance, stating what portions of the petition have evidentiary
gaps or if there are obvious deficiencies that need to be remedied. The tribe may respond to
these letters and supplement its petition. After the tribe answers the evidentiary gaps and
deficiencies in its initial petition, the OFA places the petition under active consideration
(ibid.:634-635). Frustratingly, a tribe may wait several decades before its petition is actually
considered. The slow pace of the OFA in reviewing and deciding upon petitions is often
criticized; anthropologist Jack Campisi has referred to the OFA as a “bureaucratic mill that
makes the continental drift look like a speedy process” (quoted in Cramer 2005:52). Upon
reviewing a petition, the OFA publishes the Proposed Finding in the Federal Register, describing
whether the evidence used by the tribe is valid or not, and thus, whether the tribe has met the
regulations for federal recognition. After a comment period on the Proposed Finding, the OFA
drafts the Final Determination, recommending to the Assistant Secretary – Indian Affairs
whether to recognize the tribe or not. The Assistant Secretary makes the final judgment in the
Final Determination which is published in the Federal Register. This decision, confirming or
denying federal recognition, becomes effective shortly after (Riley 2013:636-638).
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As previously mentioned, the OFA has concluded 51 petitions: 18 tribes have become
federally recognized through the process and 33 tribes have been denied. The evaluation of these
petitions is done by a team consisting of an anthropologist, a genealogist, and a historian (Riley
2014:463). Petitions should be evaluated under the standard of “reasonable likelihood of the
validity of the facts”, however, the OFA team tends to analyze and judge the evidence through
stricter, professional standards relative to their field of expertise before utilizing the regulatory
standards. For example, a genealogist requires two valid sources of documentation in order to
verify one’s descent—a standard higher than the “reasonable likelihood of the validity of the
facts” (Riley 2013:636). As a result, the standards of proof have risen over time, leading tribes
to spend more and more time and money researching and creating a detailed petition. Petitioning
tribes often hire anthropologists, genealogists, and historians in order to counteract the high level
of expertise and expectations in the OFA (Campisi 2003:506). The financial costs of producing
an adequate petition continue to increase; since 1994, the cost per petition may be $1 million or
higher—a financial burden that few non-federally recognized tribes can afford (Cramer
2005:54). Although the Federal Acknowledgment Process developed into a convoluted,
arbitrary, timely, and costly procedure, it was originally envisioned as a straightforward and
simple process, without requiring tribes to seek help and expertise from outsiders. Indeed, some
of the earliest petitions (including those that received a favorable finding) were no more than a
couple hundred pages long. Today, a petition may be over a hundred thousand pages (Campisi
2003:505-506).
The strict standards of the process have been justified by the concerns over the
“Southeast Syndrome”— illegitimate “wannabe” tribes attempting to take advantage of federal
benefits and services (Quinn 1990a). Other scholars have realized that the amount of fake tribes
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petitioning for recognition have been overestimated by the OFA (Campisi 2003:512; Starna
1991). Regardless, it does indicate that authenticity is a major question and concern regarding
American Indian tribal identities. Anxieties over authenticity, created and reproduced through
the process, lead to suspicions over inauthenticity. The tribes who are unable to meet the strict
criteria of the Federal Acknowledgment Process may be perceived as inauthentic—as fake
tribes—which in turn, further justifies the high standards of authenticity.
4. Narratives of Extinction
In the next section, I will examine how the high standards of authenticity are employed
within the Federal Acknowledgment Process through the petitions of two tribes—the Muwekma
Ohlone Tribe and the United Houma Nation. First, it would be worthwhile to express the
inherent bias of historical documentation that tribes are forced to use as evidence of their tribal
identity (or evidence that is used against them by the OFA).
Primarily, a tribe’s petition is based upon written records, whether federal, state, or local,
which document the tribe’s existence through time. Non-federally recognized tribes are often
deliberately rendered invisible and extinct in the historical record; these historical narratives may
be further reproduced in the OFA’s response to a tribe’s petition. In other words, the records of
history begin from a non-neutral perspective.
In nineteenth century New England, books, pamphlets, and other local written records
mournfully proclaimed that native people had become extinct. While these narratives asserted
the modernity of the New England region, they simultaneously denied that modernity to Indians
by creating and reproducing the myth of Indian extinction (O’Brien 2010). The perspectives and
voices of native people rarely appear in the historical record; rather, “the only history perceived
as real was that documented by Euro-Americans in public records and other sources, which
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focused on settlement by English ancestors, taming the wilderness, and subduing ‘the savage
Indian’” (Gould 2013:215).
Likewise, for a period of 50 years, in the twentieth century following the eugenics
movement, records in Virginia deliberately erased the existence of native people residing in the
state. Virginia’s Bureau of Vital Statistics refused to register anyone identifying as an Indian
while also changing the records of Indians to be read as “colored” or “negro”. Furthermore,
people who gave their children Indian names could be jailed (Cook 2002:98; Koenig and Stein
2013:129). Even in Pennsylvania today, state officials continue to assert that no American
Indians live within the state despite the existence of around 18,000 people identified as American
Indian (Minderhout and Frantz 2008).
These narratives of extinction will reappear as I recount the histories of the Muwekma
Ohlone Tribe and the United Houma Nation in the following sections. Ultimately, it seems
impossible for the recognition process to be unbiased and fair when “the evidence itself is the
product of historical policies and practices aimed at the diminution of native existence”
(Gonzales and Evans 2013:37). One scholar goes so far as to say that the recognition process
“depends on the myth that settler states did not intentionally and repeatedly attack the autonomy
of Native peoples. The recognition criteria assume that colonialism itself did not happen”
(Lowery 2009:513).
5. Alternative Identities
The alternative narrative of history from the perspective of native people fails to show up
in the historical records (and thus, is hardly expressed in the Federal Acknowledgment Process).
How might a tribe view its continued existence in the face of innumerous claims as to its
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extinction? What would an authentic tribal identity look like beyond the imposed liminality in
the recognition process?
During the Mashpee trial, Vine Deloria, Jr. identified a tribe simply as “a group of people
living pretty much in the same place who know who their relatives are” (quoted in Clifford
1988:323). The anthropologist Karen Blu recounts that tribal identity among the Lumbee people
is “based in an orientation toward life, a sense of the past, ‘a state of mind.’ It is a way of doing
and being that is ‘Indian’” (Blu 1980:xii). Likewise, Edward Spicer states, in regards to the
Yaqui people, that most typical elements that characterize an identity such as language, place of
residence, and cultural practices inevitably change. Instead, a continuous tribal identity entails
“a people’s awareness of their experience through time—their historical understanding of
themselves” (Spicer 1980:360). These three conceptions of tribal identity—the recognition of
family and ancestry, a way of being, and an awareness of a tribe’s shared history—seem to only
add more questions over the nature of an authentic tribal identity. But these questions are
primarily the concern of the federal government and not the tribes themselves. While federal
recognition confirms that a tribe is legitimate, and tribes do, in part, pursue recognition in order
to verify their identity, the value of authenticity rests in its acceptance by outsiders. A tribe is
already aware of what it is; the federal government and the general public are neither fully aware
nor accepting of what a tribe claims to be.
Rather than employing these alternative conceptions of identity, the Federal
Acknowledgment Process relies upon an imposed liminal identity conjured up by the federal
government itself. In order to examine how this imposed liminal identity is enacted in the
recognition process, I will analyze the circumstances of two petitioning tribes—the Muwekma
Ohlone Tribe and the United Houma Nation. I will first recount the history of each tribe, from
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first sustained contact to the moment that each tribe sent a letter of intent to petition for federal
recognition—a history that more often than not has rendered both tribes invisible in different
ways. Then, I will review the federal government’s response and judgment as to the petitions of
both tribes, analyzing how a liminal identity is constructed within the recognition process and
how that identity fails to be maintained.

V. The Muwekma Ohlone Tribe
1. History
The Muwekma Ohlone Tribe consists of the descendants of Costanoan (a phrase deriving
from the Spanish term, costeños, or coastal people) natives located in the San Francisco Bay
Area of California. In particular, the tribe is comprised of all the known lineages aboriginal to
the San Francisco Bay Area who trace their ancestry through three Missions established by the
Spanish empire: Mission Dolores, Santa Clara, and San Jose. Prior to European contact and the
establishment of the missions, native Californians were foragers who subsisted primarily on fish,
sea mammals, and shellfish (Leventhal et al 1994:303). Food surpluses and niche resources
provided the basis for extensive regional trade networks between native groups. These groups
were often connected through intermarriage which further supplemented trade alliances
(ibid.:304).
In the late eighteenth century, Costanoan natives encountered Spanish colonists and
missionaries who set out to dominate and control native populations by forbidding and
destroying traditional cultural, political, and economic systems. At missions established by the
Spanish empire, natives were coerced into practicing Christianity and agriculture—religious and
subsistence practices intelligible to European eyes (ibid.:305). Native Californians were
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reconstructed by the Spanish empire as “a laboring class marked as racially inferior whose work
in mines, plantations, ranches, and farms provided sustenance for the colonial population and
wealth for the crown and its minions” (Field 1999:196). Due to European-introduced diseases
coupled with harsh and overcrowded living conditions at the missions, around 80% of the native
population in the Bay Area was eliminated (Field et al 1992:415). While native resistance was a
constant threat to Spanish control, many survivors continued to reside at or near the missions.
In 1834, the Mexican government, having won independence from Spain, secularized the
missions and sought to divide mission property among the residing native Christians. Instead,
powerful californios, Hispanic families inhabiting the Bay Area, bought mission property and
established cattle ranches where, just as before, natives were used as a labor source—hired as
vaqueros (ranch hands) and domestic servants (Leventhal et al 1994:307). Shortly after, the U.S.
military invaded and took control over Californian territory. This was subsequently followed by
a new wave of American migrants enticed by prospective riches from the Gold Rush (Field et al
1992:424). By 1850, California became a U.S. state.
Unlike the Spanish missionaries and Mexican landowners, the new American settlers
preferred using Euro-American labor rather than native labor (Leventhal et al 1994:308-309).
The attitudes of the American settlers towards the natives ran deeper than simple prejudice;
rather, the state of California promoted genocidal practices on native populations. Thomas
Butler King, a federal Indian agent reporting on the Indian situation in California in 1850, stated
that California Indians were the lowest form of human beings who would inevitably become
extinct (Slagle 1989:328). Likewise, a policy of extermination was proclaimed by Peter Burnett,
California’s first governor, in his 1851 statement to the legislature: “A war of extermination will
continue to be waged between the races until the Indian race becomes extinct” (quoted in
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Laverty 2003:51). Laws were put in place to stifle the legal rights of American Indians—they
were unable to vote, provide testimony in court, or bring forth a lawsuit (Field et al 1992:424425). Other policies that followed a logic of elimination (Wolfe 2006) supported the
slaughtering and scalping of native peoples as well as the kidnapping and indenturing of Indian
children (Slagle 1989:327).
During this period, the ancestors of the Muwekma Ohlone Tribe, many from Mission San
Jose and Santa Clara, sought refuge at Alisal, a ranch owned by a californio, just south of
Pleasanton (Field et al 1992:425). At Alisal, Costanoan culture was revitalized through the
performance of dance rituals which coincided with a resurgence of language, songs, and
ceremonial regalia (ibid.:425). Traditional forms of ceremony and dance fused with the Ghost
Dance (a contemporary religious movement). This syncretic cultural revival was recorded by
several ethnographers who referred to the Indian group as the Verona Band due to their
proximity to the Verona railroad station (ibid.:426). In the early twentieth century, an increasing
amount of American settlers to the nearby land coupled with a series of fires that spread to Alisal
disrupted the community (ibid.:426). Scattered families remained connected to each other
through intermarriage and ritual godparenthood (Leventhal et al 1994:310).
Around this time, C.E. Kelsey, a federal Indian agent, was tasked with conducting a
special Indian census among the many homeless and landless Indians in California in order to
determine the amount of land to purchase for the establishment of small reservations known as
rancherias. This state of homelessness was in large part due to the fact that 18 treaties made
among many Californian native groups in the middle of the nineteenth century were never
ratified. Interestingly, coastal mission Indians, such as the Muwekma Ohlone Tribe, were not
directly involved in the signing of those treaties. Federal Indian agents viewed mission Indians
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as tame and domesticated due to their presumed conversion to Christianity and their agricultural
practices. Treaty negotiations did not seem necessary among groups perceived as already
assimilated and integrated into the economic structure of the state (Laverty 2003:53). In other
words, authentic Indianness was contested and challenged by cultural assimilation—being too
similar to the livelihood and lifestyle of non-Indian, American citizens was and continues to
remain problematic for asserting a recognizable Indian identity. This essentialist perspective
would later be echoed by the anthropologist Alfred Kroeber who authoritatively promoted the
tribe’s extinction and invisibility in 1925.
Prior to this declaration, Kelsey as well as C.H. Asbury, another federal Indian agent,
documented the existence of the Verona Band. By being recognized and identified under several
Appropriation Acts beginning in 1906—acts through which land purchases were to be made for
homeless Indians—the Verona Band attained federal recognition up until 1927 (Field 2003:8687). The sudden termination of the Verona Band was proclaimed and decided solely by
Lafayette Dorrington, an Indian agent working from Sacramento. In a letter responding to the
probable cost and amount of Indians for which land needed to be purchased, Dorrington stated,
without visiting the group itself, that the Verona Band did not need land purchased for them. In
the same letter, Dorrington’s negligence terminated the rights of around 135 other tribal groups
in California (ibid.:87). Les Field, an ethnographer, suspects that this decision was influenced by
Kroeber’s professional anthropological claim of Costanoan extinction a few years prior.
In 1925, Kroeber declared that:
“The Costanoan group is extinct so far as all practical purposes are concerned. A
few scattered individuals survive…but they are of mixed-tribal ancestry and live
almost lost among other Indians or obscure Mexicans. At best some knowledge
of the ancestral speech remains among them. The old habits of life have long
since been abandoned” (Kroeber 1925:464).
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When Kroeber retracted his claim thirty years later, he clarified his meaning by stating,
“Anthropologists sometimes have gone a step farther, and when they can no longer learn from
living informants the speech and modes of life of the ancestors of these informants, they talk of
that tribe or group as being extinct—when they mean merely that knowledge of the aboriginal
language and culture has become extinct among the survivors” (Kroeber and Heizer 1970:3).
However, this statement still entailed an essentialist and static concept of culture where change
and assimilation contaminates the purity of traditional native culture. Once contaminated, the
authentic Indian fades from view. In lamenting the loss of traditional culture, anthropologists
who practiced salvage ethnography, such as Kroeber, had reinforced the inevitably of Indian
cultural extinction. As Lisa Aldred recounts:
“Any semblance of similarity to Anglo culture meant the Native Americans in
question had unidimensionally ‘assimilated’; the culture was therefore ‘spoiled’
for ethnographic inquiry into the ‘primitive’. Euroamerican societies were
allowed to culturally borrow and change, but Native American societies’ cultures
were either freeze-framed into a static, almost romanticized, image or else
deemed ‘vanished’ or ‘assimilated’” (Aldred 1993:212).
Despite their invisibility as a result of termination and claims of extinction, the
Muwekma Ohlone Tribe persisted as a community and people. Inspired by the civil rights and
red power movement including the occupation of Alcatraz in the late 1960s (Russell 2007),
families organized as the Ohlone Indian Tribe. This was done specifically to obtain rights over
the Ohlone Cemetery at Mission San Jose—an important burial ground for the tribe (Field
2003:88). Following this, the tribe reorganized themselves in 1984 as the Muwekma Ohlone
Tribe and “set about structuring themselves in response to the BIA’s regulations for tribal
governance, even though those regulations did not correspond to the historic ways bands like the
Ohlones had interacted and related to one another” (ibid.:88). The tribe must fit western
standards of political organization in order to be visible and comprehensible. The situation was
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no different when the tribe first encountered Spanish colonists who demanded that the natives
practice agriculture and convert to Christianity. Continuously, native peoples are imposed to fit
particular forms of identity in order to be recognized, literally and legally.
A desire to be recognized was spurred by the tribe’s deep spiritual concern and
responsibility towards its ancestors, as previously witnessed by the tribe’s desire to protect the
Ohlone burial ground (Field et al 1992:419). At first, this responsibility led to the tribe’s demand
that the bones of its ancestors that reside in museums and universities ought to be repatriated and
given proper burials. This incited the response from archaeologists who attempted to discredit
the tribe’s authenticity—channeling Kroeber’s claims of extinction (ibid.:422). In 1989, the tribe
reached an agreement with Stanford University to return the ancestral bones in its collection
(Gross 1989). During that same year, the tribe petitioned for federal recognition. Undoubtedly,
attaining more substantial rights over burial sites and excavated bones was a significant reason
for pursuing recognition (Russell 2007). The importance of being federally recognized for the
repatriation of burial remains was confirmed one year later, in 1990, with the passage of the
Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act (NAGPRA). In confirming the
importance of federal recognition, the act, defining “tribe” in terms of being federally
recognized, delegitimizes the tribes that pursue repatriation yet lack federal recognition (Barker
2013; Talbert 2012).
After petitioning for federal recognition in 1989, the tribe conducted extensive research
on their history and genealogy, spending tens of thousands of dollars in order to gather enough
documentary evidence that supported their continued existence as a tribe (Field 2003:88). In
1996, the Branch of Acknowledgment and Research (BAR), which handled petitions for federal
recognition prior to its reorganization as the Office of Federal Acknowledgment (OFA), affirmed
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that the federal government had previously recognized the tribe as the Verona Band as late as
1927 (ibid.:88). This allowed the Muwekma Ohlone Tribe to use revised criteria—the tribe
merely had to demonstrate its continued existence from the latest date of previous recognition
(i.e. 1927) up until the present. After compiling thousands of pages of evidence and responding
to several technical assistance letters from the BAR, the petition qualified for active
consideration in 1998. The tribe, however, was concerned that the petition would not be
resolved for another 20 years given the BAR’s slow pace in resolving petitions. Unwilling to
wait, the tribe filed a lawsuit against the BAR, compelling the BAR to complete its review of the
petition within twelve months via a court issued writ of mandamus. The court found that the
BAR’s delay of the tribe’s petition was unreasonable and demanded that the BAR make a final
determination by 2002 (Mather 2003:1854-1856). By July 2001, the BAR submitted the
proposed finding which stated that the Muwekma Ohlone Tribe would not meet the criteria for
federal recognition. The negative determination was finalized and became effective on
December 16, 2002.
2. Identity on Trial
The tribe failed to meet three out of the seven mandatory criteria under the revised
regulations for tribes with prior unambiguous federal recognition—criterion (a) that the group
has been continuously identified as an Indian entity since 1927 until the present; criterion (b) that
the group comprises a distinct community in the present; and criterion (c) that the group has
maintained continuous political influence or authority over its members since 1927 until the
present.
In regards to criterion (a), the BAR stated that since 1927, the tribe was identified as an
Indian entity in the years between 1965 and 1971 and from 1982 to the present. Due to the
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almost four decades after 1927 of no identification as an Indian entity and only a 6-year period of
identification during the 55 years between 1927 and 1982, the BAR declared that the tribe had
not been identified as an Indian entity on a substantially continuous basis since 1927 (BAR
2002:45). The most common dismissal of the tribe’s proposed evidence is that it merely
indicated the existence and identity of individual Indians rather than a larger Indian entity to
which they belong. This is most notable in the rejection of John P. Harrington’s ethnographic
field notes on the tribe in the late 1920s and early 1930s. According to the BAR, Harrington
never explicitly referred to the Indians he visited and interviewed as members of a tribe and
community (ibid.:13). Harrington, however, was focused on recording and preserving historical
Indian languages—just as the BAR states—he was primarily interested in the past rather than
contemporary tribal communities (ibid.:14). If “Harrington did not comment on existing social
relationships nor portray his informants as part of an existing community or group” (ibid.:14),
this perhaps reflects Harrington’s methodology of salvage ethnography rather than the actual
absence of a tribal community.
As previously noted with Kroeber, salvage ethnography promotes the inevitably of Indian
cultural extinction by framing culture in essentialist and static terms. Harrington’s focus, then,
may have been on preserving the “pure” Indian from an idealized past presumably prior to
cultural change and assimilation. Under this essentialist framework, the social organization of
contemporary Indians was not of primary concern since they were no longer culturally or
linguistically “pure”—no longer fully Indian. This fits neatly with Kroeber’s statements in 1955
when he retracted the claim of Costanoan extinction, yet retained the idea that once native
culture and language goes extinct among surviving Indians, they are just that: mere survivors and
descendants of Indians (Kroeber and Heizer 1970:3). Interestingly, when the tribe attempted to
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use Kroeber’s 1955 statements as evidence of Indian identification, the BAR argued that
Kroeber’s primary point was that “historical groups that had lost their distinct culture had
surviving lineal descendants…this was a statement about the survival of individual descendants,
rather than Indian groups” (BAR 2002:28). In this case, the BAR directly applied essentialist
notions of authentic Indian culture from Kroeber’s underlying logic—the loss of distinct culture
also entails the loss of authentic Indian communities.
Other evidence contested by the BAR includes the enrollment records from the Sherman
Institute in Riverside, California in the 1930s and an Indian school in Chemawa, Oregon in the
1940s. The tribe argued that since several members enrolled in these two Indian schools, both
institutions confirmed, approved, and identified them as part of the tribe. The BAR contended
that there was no clear identification of their tribal affiliation—the records list their tribes as
“Digger” and “Mission”. These generic references, according to the BAR, did not refer to a
specific tribal entity (ibid.:25-26). However, the use of these terms may have resulted from the
negligence of the school administrators who did not care to document or recognize the exact
existence of a particular tribe and community. Thus, a derogatory term and a generic regional
term would suffice. As noted by Mark Myers, it is often the case that historical documents and
census records fail to record particular tribal identifications; often, they fail to identify individual
Indians as Indians, but instead as black or white (Myers 2001:280-281).
Lastly, the tribe mentioned that letters written by archaeologists in 1985 (although the
BAR did admit that the tribe was identified since 1982, these letters were rejected as a basis of
evidence) were addressed to “Members of the Muwekma Families”—as a form of tribal
identification (BAR 2002:40). The BAR stated that this reference alongside other references of
“Ohlone descendants” and an Indian “family” did not sufficiently identify “a larger Indian
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entity” (ibid.:42). In this statement, the BAR seemed to imply that a tribe must be organized
above the level of the family. Yet, for the Muwekma Ohlone Tribe, family has always been the
core and underlying unit of the tribal community—as noted prior through the significance of
marriage and ritual godparenthood. The importance of family was also demonstrated through the
tribe’s desire to protect its burial ground and the burial remains of its ancestors. Overall, the
arguments from the BAR, in regards to criterion (a), indicate that the tribe was not perceived as a
cohesive social and political entity because it was not predominantly organized, socially or
politically, above the level of the family. In other words, the tribe was too different from western
standards of political organization to be recognized and made intelligible in the present. This
difference, as part of the tribe’s imposed liminality, will be further emphasized and discussed in
regards to criterion (c).
First, however, the other side of the tribe’s liminal identity within the process must be
considered—of the tribe being perceived as intelligible and assimilated to the surrounding
society and community. The tribe failed to meet the revised criterion (b) which required the tribe
to demonstrate that it comprises a distinct community at present. As summarized by the BAR,
much of the evidence demonstrated limited aspects of community that existed up until 1950
(citing cases of godparenting); most of the submitted evidence did not deal with the present day,
which is the basis of the revised criterion (ibid.:99). The BAR argued that informal family
gatherings, godparenting, and other activities performed by the tribe were done by only a small
percentage of the tribe’s members as well as with non-Indians (ibid.:47). In analyzing the
residential patterns of the tribe’s members, the BAR continued to argue that the community was
not wholly unified—“the petitioner lived widely distributed in the southeastern San Francisco
Bay/San Jose area among several million non-Indians. A residential pattern such as this one did
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not allow the presumption that the members were in close contact with one another…” (ibid.:4748, emphasis added). The BAR seemed to infer that a scattered Indian community could not
exist among a surrounding non-Indian community—such a community would be too integrated
and assimilated to stand on its own. As the BAR asserted, evidence of a distinct community may
be proven at a particular point in time if “more than 50 percent of the members reside in a
geographical area exclusively or almost exclusively composed of members of the groups…”
(ibid.:58). Exclusive territory control, isolated and presumably socially and culturally insulated
from outside influences, operates as a proxy for proof of non-assimilation. Without this
isolation, the tribe’s claims to an authentic Indian identity are questioned. Scholars such as
Lorinda Riley have pointed out that the BAR/OFA tends to favor large, land-based tribes and
tends to disfavor scattered tribal communities that lack control over a given territory in regards to
criterion (b) (Riley 2013:650). Ironically, the federal government that failed to secure land for
the many Indians tribes in California is now punishing the same tribes for not having a land base.
Despite the fact that the tribe was involved in certain sacred and secular ritual activities,
in the obligations of godparenthood and the practice of Roman Catholicism, these practices did
not constitute evidence of a distinct community. As stated by the BAR, cultural patterns that are
shared among a significant portion of the group must be different from those of the surrounding
non-Indian populace (BAR 2002:93). Thus, the BAR claimed that ritual godparenthood was not
evidence of a distinctive community “because the network of godparenting relationships is not
separate and distinct, is not under the control or design of the group, and is not different from the
non-Indian population with whom they live, marry, and socialize” (ibid.:93). Interaction, as
noted by the references to living, marrying, and socializing, with non-Indians seems to obfuscate
the tribe’s distinctive Indian identity. Furthermore, the tribe’s overwhelming affiliation to the
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Catholic Church served to discredit the validity of a distinct Indian community. Even if
Catholicism was a key aspect of the tribal community, the BAR perceived it as a lack of
necessary cultural difference—as evidence of cultural assimilation and integration into American
society (ibid.:94). Essentially, the Muwekma Ohlone Tribe was not different enough—spatially,
socially, or culturally, from the surrounding non-Indian society to be considered an authentic and
distinctive Indian community.
The final part of the criteria that the tribe failed to meet was criterion (c). According to
the BAR, there was insufficient evidence that identified political leaders or a governing body
with political influence or authority over the tribe’s members on a substantially continuous basis
since 1927 (ibid.:139). No political action seemed to be taken on behalf of a larger Indian entity,
beyond that of close family members (ibid.:101). Upon referring to a variety of sources,
including Harrington’s field notes and Kroeber’s statements on the survival of Indian
descendants, the BAR argued that no one had explicitly identified tribal leaders or a governing
body (ibid.:104-106). In 1989, local newspaper articles did identify a leader of the tribe in
contrast to articles from 1971 and 1972 which did not (local newspaper articles, however, are not
usually viewed as knowledgeable sources in the BAR) (ibid.:106). This shift in recognition
aligns with the tribe’s formal reorganization into the Muwekma Ohlone Tribe in 1984—with a
tribal council of elected leaders framed by a written constitution. It appears that, similar to the
circumstances of criterion (a) where no tribal entity was continuously identified, the failure to
recognize tribal leaders is due not to their actual absence, but due to the manner in which tribal
authority is understood and acknowledged by western standards. After 1984, the tribe was
politically intelligible to western standards of governance. In other words, prior to its political
reorganization, the tribe failed to resemble post-1934 IRA-style tribes (Field 2003:89-90). As
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previously discussed, the Indian Reorganization Act definitively established the jurisdictional
sense of recognition while formalizing the structure of tribal governance. This reorganization
supplanted informal consensus-based forms of government (Meyer 1999:233). Thus, the nonrecognized tribes that maintained an informal government (after 1934) would not be legally
legible within the expectations of the federal government as to what constitutes legitimate
political authority. For example, among many Salish tribes in the northwest, political authority
was not formalized, but rather based upon the influence of individuals knowledgeable in a
particular skill or field (e.g. fishing or hunting). As is the case with the Muwekma Ohlone Tribe,
informal leadership impedes on the tribe’s attempts to be recognized—highlighting how the
formal criteria of the recognition process “are in some cases inconsistent with customs of historic
tribes” (Sweeney 2001:219). At best, these traditional customs were interpreted by the BAR as
informal actions performed, among individual families, on an “ad-hoc basis” (specifically
regarding the protection and maintenance of the Ohlone cemetery) (BAR 2002:115), devaluing
their political import. Due to the tribe’s informal, familial-based political organization (prior to
its reorganization in 1984), the tribe was perceived as too different from western standards of
political authority and governance.
Ultimately, the liminal identity imposed on the Muwekma Ohlone Tribe leads to its own
dissolution. The tribe cannot be both different enough from U.S. society and culture and similar
enough to western forms of political organization. The tribe cannot simultaneously exist in a
mythical past, uncontaminated by American cultural and social influences, and in the modern
world, fully acclimated to western standards of governance. Traditional, informal political
governance and the importance of family as the basis of community entailed that the tribe was
too different from the expectations of the government and society that bestows recognition upon

43

the tribe. On the other hand, geographic, social and cultural proximity to non-Indians marked the
tribe as too assimilated, too similar to the government and society that wants to recognize the
tribe’s distinctiveness.

VI. The United Houma Nation
1. History
The United Houma Nation, presently comprised of over 17,000 members, resides in
southern Louisiana, across several parishes, or counties, inhabiting secluded marshes and
bayous. The tribe descends from the historic Houma Indians who were originally described by
French explorers in the late seventeenth century; most notably in 1682 by René Robert Cavalier,
Sieur de La Salle who documented the “Ouma” people located on the east bank of the
Mississippi River, opposite of the mouth of the Red River and north of Baton Rouge (Davis
2001:479). The tribe interacted with several other tribal groups along the Mississippi, such as
the Bayogoula, through alliances and intermarriage as well as through warfare (ibid.:478). The
Houma also formed an alliance with the French who helped mediate a land dispute between the
Houma and the Bayogoula—establishing the hunting land boundaries between the tribes by the
placement of a red stick or pole (from which the city Baton Rouge received its name) (Miller
2004:159). Although the population of Mississippi tribal groups was severely diminished as a
result of diseases introduced by Europeans, the tribe survived, often intermarrying with other
diminished tribal groups (Davis 2001:478), and migrated south along the Mississippi River in the
early eighteenth century in order to be closer to their French allies and further away from tribes
allied with the English (Miller 2004:160).
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In order to avoid British rule after the French and Indian War (ending in 1763), the tribe
moved to the west bank of the Mississippi, which was then under Spanish control (Duthu
1997:421). As a result of colonial rivalries vying for the loyalty and support of the tribe, fissures
within the Houma led to the establishment of several Houma communities with opposing tribal
leaders (ibid.:421-422). There is no clear documentary evidence as to what happened to the
communities or where the tribe migrated to and resettled. For the federal government, the
absence of written records during this period marks the historic tribe’s extinction (presumably
through assimilation and disease), disrupting the ancestral link between the historic tribe and the
present-day tribe, and thus, nullifying the tribe’s acknowledgment claims (Miller 2004:161).
Oral traditions of the Houma, however, do explain that the tribe, or at least one of the
Houma communities, migrated near present-day Montegut, a town just south of Houma,
Louisiana on Bayou Terrebonne (or Terrebonne Parish)—an area that the present-day tribe
continues to inhabit (ibid.:161). The tribe, led by Louis le Sauvage, was allowed to settle on this
land due to Spanish land grants given to the tribe in the 1780s (Duthu 1997:423). In 1803, the
United States acquired Louisiana through the Louisiana Purchase. Leaders of the Houma tribe
met with the governor of the Orleans Territory, William C.C. Claiborne, in 1806 and 1811. The
leaders, including one identified as chief Chac-chouma, were given uniform coats as presents.
Oral tradition suggests that one of the other chiefs present was Louis le Sauvage (ibid.:424).
When confronted with U.S. Indian removal policies in the 1830s, the Houma strategically
avoided detection and external identification as Indians. The tribe withdrew to isolated
settlements, in undesirable and uncultivated swamps and marshes (Moberg and Moberg
2005:97). According to Houma oral tradition, Rosalie Courteau, niece of Louis le Sauvage, was
an important leader for the Houma during this period, although influential family members also
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held informal political influence in their respective communities (Duthu 1997:428-429).
Likewise, traditional healers called “traiteurs” exerted informal influence and commanded
respect (Miller 2004:174). Around the mid-nineteenth century, the Houma resided in several
diffuse communities along Bayou Terrebonne, Bayou DuLarge, Bayou Petit Caillou, Bayou
Pointe aux Chenes, Bayou Grand Caillou, and Bayou Lafourche (Duthu 1997:427). The Houma
adapted to the isolated swamplands by relying predominantly on fishing and hunting. Interaction
between the settlements was maintained through a system of canals or “trenasses”—the creation
and maintenance of these canals was an important communal event. The preparation of tasso—
stripping, smoking, and drying caught fish—was also an important communal and social event
(ibid.:428).
In the early twentieth century, the tribe was visited by anthropologists, most notably by
John R. Swanton who documented the tribe’s subsistence practices and recorded a small
vocabulary of surviving words from the tribe’s traditional language. At the time, French was the
predominant language among the Houma people and it continues to be important today (Moberg
and Moberg 2005:97). While Swanton viewed the tribe as a mixture of various remnant tribal
groups with Houma being the dominant element, another anthropologist, M. Raymond
Harrington, who was writing in 1908, stated that the Houma were nearly extinct and lived like
the white people near them without many surviving Indian cultural traits (Miller 2004:176-177).
Similar to Kroeber’s statements regarding the extinction of Costanoan natives in the previous
Muwekma Ohlone case, the claim of extinction coupled with the notion of assimilation must be
contextualized within the methodology of salvage ethnography and anthropology in general. A
methodology that adopts an essentialist framework of culture disallows the possibility of tribal
continuity when faced with cultural change or assimilation. Continuity may only exist when a
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culture is idealized in a timeless, unmoving past. Such logic continues to exist today—pervading
the Federal Acknowledgment Process.
Due to the tribe’s awkward racial identity (neither black nor white) in the binary racial
classification system of the early 1900s in Louisiana, access to education for the tribe was
limited. Indian children were prohibited from attending “white only” schools and the tribe
refused to attend segregated schools for black children (ibid.:180). In 1913, Henry Billiot, a
member of the tribe, took legal action in order to compel the local school administration to
permit Indian children to white schools. In response, the school stated that Indians (specifically
referring to Billiot’s children) were “of the colored race” and thus, were unable to attend “white
only” schools (Duthu 1997:430). Local non-Indian residents, noting the tribe’s racial ambiguity,
began referring to Houma individuals as “sabines”—a derogatory term implying that Houma
people were the product of illicit sexual liaisons between blacks and whites (Miller 2004:180).
With local resistance and discrimination towards the tribe’s educational pursuits, the tribe turned
to the federal government in order to secure funding. In 1931, the federal government
dispatched Roy Nash in order to investigate the tribe and its claims. While acknowledging the
tribe’s Indian identity, Nash stated that the Houma people were of mixed blood with a small
percentage of black blood. This would serve as justification in denying the tribe’s educational
demands (Duthu 1997:430). These statements were bolstered by the claims of the Terrebonne
Parish school superintendent, Henry L. Bourgeois, who argued that the Houma were mixed
bloods unfit to attend white schools, referring to them as “so-called” Indians (Bourgeois 1938).
Still, anthropologists such as Ruth Underwood and Frank Speck supported and recommended
federal aid for the Houma people.

47

Without federal support, the tribe had to rely upon missionary schools for education. In
the mid-twentieth century, the state established an Indian school for the Houma within the
Terrebonne Parish (Duthu 1997:431). By the early 1960s, Tom Dion, a member of the Houma,
led the concerted effort to desegregate public schools in the area. Integration appeared to be the
best option due to the substandard education provided at Indian schools (Miller 2004:187). In
the subsequent court case in 1963, the tribe won, mandating the desegregation of the school
system and allowing Houma Indians to attend. Spurred by their victory in court, the civil rights
movement, and their participation in the American Indian Chicago Conference, the Houma
people began to actively pursue their rights and assert their identity as an Indian tribe (ibid.:188).
This political activism would lead them to petition for federal acknowledgment.
By 1972, the Houma Tribe was established with a formalized government. Houma
members who were located along Bayou Grand Caillou felt underrepresented by 1974 and
decided to break away and create their own political organization named the Houma Alliance
(ibid.:189). Although the tribe was state recognized in the 1970s and received minor funds and
services, most of the Houma people were illiterate and impoverished (ibid.:190-191). A survey
done in the 1980s indicated that the median household income of the Houma was less than half
of the state average (Faine and Bohlander 1986). Other studies reveal that around 50% of
Houma members, specifically residing in Terrebonne Parish and Lafourche Parish, had incomes
in 1989 that fell below the poverty level (Duthu 1997:433). Attaining federal recognition would
ameliorate the tribe’s state of affairs.
In 1979, the two Houma groups (the Houma Tribe and the Houma Alliance) decided to
merge in order to more effectively pursue recognition; the United Houma Nation was formed. In
that same year, the tribe sent its letter of intent to petition for federal acknowledgment (being one
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of the largest groups, in terms of population, to petition through the Federal Acknowledgment
Process). The United Houma Nation submitted its petition in 1985 and responded to subsequent
letters of obvious deficiencies (technical assistance letters) from the BAR who wanted more
historical documentation to verify the tribe’s Indian identity. Ultimately, the United Houma
Nation provided enough historical records and genealogical data to cover seventeen feet of
storage space (Miller 2004:193). While waiting for the petition to qualify for active
consideration, the tribe pursued an alternative path to federal acknowledgment—through
legislation. Senator J. Bennett Johnston introduced a bill granting federal recognition to the
tribe; however, as a result of opposition from oil companies fearing the loss of oil-rich land (land
which would be reserved for the tribe if it became federally recognized), the bill never passed
(Moberg and Moberg 2005:102-103). In 1994, the BAR released its proposed finding; it stated
that the tribe did not meet the regulations for acknowledgment. Seventeen feet of evidence was
not enough to prove the tribe’s identity. After the tribe’s rebuttal to the negative finding in 1996,
no further action has been taken. A final determination has not yet been made.
2. Identity on Trial
According to the proposed finding, the United Houma Nation failed to meet three out of
the seven criteria—criterion (b) that the group comprises a distinct community and has existed as
a community from historical times until the present; criterion (c) that the group has maintained
political influence or authority over its members as an autonomous entity from historical times
until the present; and criterion (e) that the group’s membership consists of individuals who
descend from a historical Indian tribe or from historical Indian tribes which combined and
functioned as a single autonomous political entity. As previously mentioned, the tribe’s
acknowledgment claims were nullified by the BAR’s contention that the historic Houma tribe

49

went extinct through intermarriage (assimilation) and disease in the late eighteenth century and
thus, never migrated from the Mississippi River to the southern bayou areas where the current
tribe resides (Miller 2004:161). Therefore, the three failed criteria must be prefaced by this
perspective—the United Houma Nation is unable to descend from a historic tribe that went
extinct and it is unable to maintain social and political continuity from an extinguished tribe. In
other words, the United Houma Nation fails to meet criterion (b) and criterion (c) prior to 1830,
prior to its migration and resettlement, and criterion (e) in general.
Regarding criterion (b), the BAR stated that the tribe did not migrate to Bayou
Terrebonne as a cohesive group, but as individuals—mostly comprised of non-Indians (BAR
1994:7-8). Of the three main ancestral families to the modern tribe—Billiot, Courteau, and
Verdin—the BAR argued that only one family was of identifiable Indian descent (and not
necessarily affiliated with the historic Houma tribe). The Courteau family was associated with
the Biloxi tribe; the Billiot family was of mixed ancestry—African-American and German
Creole; and the Verdin family was mixed—German/French Creole and unidentified Indian
(ibid.:9-10). The mixed racial ancestry of the founding families suggests that the tribe was not
distinctive enough and already too assimilated to be authentic Indians—more European in
cultural and social orientation than Indian (Miller 2004:168). Referring to the possibility of
assimilation in this scenario, the BAR wrote, “Indian individuals and families also joined nonIndian society. Some Indians married non-Indian settlers. Others took on many of the customs
of the new population. They were baptized. They learned and used the French language. They
farmed and cared for domesticated animals. They held slaves. Some obtained land grants”
(BAR 1994:8). The BAR implied that adopting European practices was incommensurable to an
authentic Indian identity. Acculturation, however, was essentially inevitable and integral to the
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histories of most tribes. Upon first contact with Spanish missionaries, the ancestors of the
Muwekma Ohlone Tribe were forced into practicing agriculture and Christianity. Likewise, the
ancestors of the United Houma Nation were in close contact with several colonial powers (most
notably the French) which greatly influenced the tribe’s settlement patterns and its alliances with
other tribal groups. Still, the acknowledgment process prefers recognizing, in part, the ideal,
mythical Indian stuck in a timeless past, uncontaminated from European influence.
Between 1830 and 1880, the tribe did meet the requirements of criterion (b) due to a
particular regulation which allows tribes to meet the community criterion if it is shown that more
than 50% of its members reside in a geographical area exclusively or almost near exclusively
composed of members of the group (ibid.:11). This area “extended from just north of modern
Montegut to Isle Jean-Charles on Bayou Terrebonne” (ibid.:12); its relative isolation allowed the
tribe to maintain its necessary distinctiveness and difference from American society. As the tribe
diffused into several different communities in the second half of the nineteenth century, the BAR
presumed that the entire tribe across each community was no longer socially and politically
connected (ibid.:13). Thus, the tribe did not meet the distinctive community requirement from
1880 to 1940, although individual Houma communities taken on their own could possibly meet
the requirement (given their exclusive inhabitation of the area) (ibid.:14). By the mid-1940s,
members of the tribe began to settle in urban areas for work which coincided with higher rates of
exogamous marriage with non-Indians (ibid.:14). Although there was some evidence, after 1940,
of group activity between communities (e.g. fishing and trapping), this does not account wholly
for the entire tribe, especially the members residing in urban areas like New Orleans (ibid.:15).
Therefore, the tribe failed to meet criterion (b) from 1940 to the present. Overall, the criterion
was only met between 1830 and 1880. As in the previous case with the Muwekma Ohlone
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Tribe, close proximity—spatially (in urban areas), culturally, and socially—to American society
served to delegitimize the tribe’s Indian identity. The tribe’s mixed racial ancestry only further
complicated and obscured its authenticity. The United Houma Nation was declared as too
similar or too assimilated to non-Indian society and culture; or rather as not distinctive enough as
American Indians.
If a tribe meets criterion (b) with sufficient evidence for a particular time period, the BAR
admits that the tribe also qualifies for criterion (c) for that same time period. Thus, the tribe
demonstrated political influence or authority over its members due to the tribe’s exclusive
inhabitation in the bayou areas between 1830 and 1880 (ibid.:18). At the same time, however,
the BAR disregarded the tribe’s oral tradition emphasizing the importance of Rosalie Courteau
during that time period (ibid.:19). From 1880 to 1930, the BAR stated that there was no specific
evidence detailing political influence or authority, despite Swanton’s ethnographic description as
to the existence of leaders in the Houma communities (ibid.:20). Between 1930 and 1940, there
was limited evidence of political leadership regarding the issue of segregated schools and the
attempts to attain educational aid and funding through the federal government (ibid.:20). Lastly,
from 1940 to the present, the BAR stated that there existed evidence of an informal, kinshipbased system of leadership within the separate Houma communities—mostly comprised of “adhoc” leaders (ibid.:20-21).
Even with their formal structure of governance, since the 1970s, the BAR argued that
very few people in the tribe were involved in political activities—meetings weren’t well attended
and voting participation in tribal elections was also very low (ibid.:21). Low political
participation does not necessarily imply a lack of political influence or authority, especially for a
tribe that had recently adopted a new formal structure of governance. Consider the Upper Skagit
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Indian Tribe (in Washington) who reestablished its system of government in the 1970s (shortly
after the tribe attained federal recognition). In 1981, 124 individuals voted in the tribal elections,
but in 1983 only 56 individuals voted (Miller 1989:92). Bruce G. Miller suggests that low
political participation was in part due to a sense of disillusionment with the tribe’s new style of
government, which was drastically different from the tribe’s traditional system of informal and
consensual governance (ibid.:92). As tribes, recently recognized or pursuing recognition,
struggle to operate within unfamiliar forms of governance, the BAR view traditional forms of
informal, familial-based governance (Duthu 1997:428-429, 434) as insufficient evidence for
criterion (c)—informal political leadership is merely “ad hoc” and too vague (BAR 1994:21-22).
As previously demonstrated with the Muwekma Ohlone Tribe’s petition, the BAR requires the
petitioning tribe to fit the IRA model of governance—with formal bureaucratic positions filled
by democratically elected leaders—even if the tribe under examination has never or only
recently adopted a formal government. A formal tribal council organized through a written
constitution is far more intelligible (to the BAR) than a system of governance perceived as
informal, consensual, or “acephalous” (Evans-Pritchard 1940). In other words, the United
Houma Nation’s form of political organization, for most of its history since European contact,
was not directly translatable into western understandings of political authority and governance.
The tribe was too different, politically, from the expectations of the federal government.
Since the BAR held that the United Houma Nation did not descend from the historic
Houma group, the tribe failed to meet criterion (e). The BAR further supplemented this decision
by pointing out the racial mixture of the founding generation of the modern tribe. Most of the
members of the founding generation were identified as non-Indian in contemporary nineteenthcentury documents despite oral traditions ascribing their Indian ancestry (BAR 1994:25). As
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mentioned in the Muwekma Ohlone case, contemporary records often fail to identify American
Indians as such. They are likewise prone to contemporary racial biases. Louisiana’s bifurcated
racial classification system promoted the use of the derogatory term “sabine” to describe the
Houma people. Local school administrators readily grouped the tribe with African Americans,
imploring the Houma to attend the segregated schools for black children. Consider the
identification of one Houma individual, Manette Renaud, across three different decades in the
federal census. In 1850, she was identified as mulatto, in 1860 as Indian, and in 1880 as white
(Miller 2004:171). With this much racial confusion, it is unlikely that Houma members were
consistently and accurately identified as Indian.
Furthermore, the BAR declared that the only founding family who was of identifiable
Indian descent was not affiliated with the historic Houma tribe; rather, the Courteau family was
from the Biloxi tribe (BAR 1994:26). This neat ascription does not necessarily preclude the fact
that the family was affiliated with the historic Houma people. As noted in the history section,
tribes in the Mississippi area often merged and intermarried. The presumed tribal affiliation to
the Biloxi “merely suggests the Houma accepted exogamous marriages, a common practice
among pre-contact Native American societies” (Duthu 1997:426). The BAR concluded its
argument by claiming that “the ancestral community represented Indian individuals separated
from their tribes of origin who intermarried with non-Indians in the founding generation” (BAR
1994:27, emphasis added). From the perspective of the BAR, intermarriage with non-Indians
operated as a form of assimilation (despite the fact that exogamous marriage was a tribal
practice) and likewise, the tribe’s racial ambiguity, as a result of this intermarriage, served to
discredit the tribe’s authenticity. In this sense, the tribe was perceived as both too similar to
American society—through intermarriage and presumed assimilation—and too different from
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the idealized image of the American Indian as one particular race—due to the tribe’s multiracial
ancestry.
Throughout most of the proposed finding, the BAR denied the value and importance of
the tribe’s oral traditions. This includes the identification of political leaders, particular
ancestors identified as Indian/Houma (rather than non-Indian), and most significantly, the United
Houma Nation’s ancestral connection to the historic Houma tribe. Ultimately, the failure to
recognize the United Houma Nation stems from the BAR’s dismissal of the tribe’s oral
traditions. Oral tradition tends to only be accepted as valid evidence when corroborated with
tangible evidence—“the undervaluation of oral tradition biases the process towards Western
ideas of what constitutes legitimate evidence” (Riley 2013:649). In James Clifford’s account of
the Mashpee court case regarding land claims made by the tribe, the hierarchical authority of
written sources of evidence over oral sources of evidence is made clear. The court case relied
upon and valued literate over oral forms of evidence in order to reach a judicial decision
(Clifford 1988:339). Clifford claims that there is a fundamental epistemic difference between
literate and oral forms of knowledge. Oral histories recounted during the trial entailed many
different voices recalling incomplete fragments of stories and memories of the tribe, often
appearing contradictory. There was no single narrative, no objective truth to these oral
histories—it wouldn’t be sensible to argue that an objective literate truth could emerge from
these narratives. Yet, documentary evidence imposes an objective reading of history—the truth
of the tribe’s Indian identity “had to exist or not exist as an objective documentary fact persisting
through time” (ibid.:340). The documented truth of an Indian tribe has predominantly been in
the hands of outsiders (ibid.:340). Even today, the truth of a tribe’s identity must be confirmed
through the federal government and its acknowledgment process. For the United Houma Nation,
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the absence of documented proof as to its ancestral connection to the historic Houma tribe
implies that no connection objectively exists. Without documentary evidence, the tribe’s own
oral tradition, recounting its migration from the Mississippi River to the southern bayou
territories, is devalued and ignored. This suggests that the tribe, relying upon oral tradition, is
too different from western standards of intelligibility. The BAR is unable to directly translate
oral histories into documented historical facts. As tribes rely upon their oral traditions, they are
unable to meet western standards of legitimate evidence—they are perceived as too different and
incomprehensible to American society. Alternatively, when tribes are consistently documented
and recorded throughout time, they may be suspiciously viewed as already too assimilated, too
integrated into American society.
The liminal identity imposed upon the United Houma Nation cannot be maintained. At
times, the tribe appeared as too different from the expectations of the federal government—not
assimilated enough to the political standards of American society or to the juridical standards of
evidence that favors written sources of history over oral sources of history. At other times, the
tribe appeared as too assimilated or as not distinctive enough from American society; the tribe
was too integrated, socially and culturally, into the nation-state—through the presumed historical
adoption of European values and a European lifestyle, geographic proximity to non-Indians as
well as intermarriage with non-Indians.

VII. Conclusion
The plight of these two tribes, the Muwekma Ohlone Tribe and the United Houma
Nation, in the Federal Acknowledgment Process reveals that the same stories on American
Indian tribes and American Indian identities continue to be retold, as Clifford once remarked—
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tribes are caught between a timeless past and an assimilative present. The recognition process
appears as a scripted play that non-federally recognized tribes are forced to perform in. The
scripts are handed to them from the federal government, albeit most tribes aren’t given enough
time to memorize their lines. The costumes, of headdresses, beads, and animal hides, are
uncomfortably worn by the tribes. Suddenly, the play begins and the federal government
spectates from the audience in order to judge the quality of the performance. The linearity of the
story breaks down as parts of the play are performed out of order or simultaneously in a jumbled
mess—the script demands that certain parts are played all at once. From this cacophonous mess,
it seems impossible to recognize any semblance of meaning, any coherent sense of the tribe’s
performance. The audience’s immersion is broken; they have seen this story performed
thousands of times and are already aware of how it will end. The federal government is also no
longer immersed in the story and the performance. The federal government becomes aware of
the artificiality of the costumes, the stage, and the performance itself. In the end, the federal
government is disappointed that the anachronistic fantasy—the story it wants to tell—collapses
on itself. The immersive and seemingly magical, anachronistic, liminal space cannot be
maintained when one is grounded in reality. The tribes, now perceived as failed performers, are
dismissed from the stage; they disappear behind the curtain.
To put it more plainly, the liminal identity imposed within the Federal Acknowledgment
Process—of difference from and similarity to the nation-state—fails to be maintained by the
majority of tribes that pursue federal recognition. Tribes must be socially and culturally distinct
from American society. Tribes must also be intelligible and assimilated to western standards of
political governance and authority. One side of the imposed liminality places petitioning tribes
in a mythical past, isolated from outside influences; the other side of the imposed liminality
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places petitioning tribes in the present, influenced by and attuned to the political standards of
western society. Petitioning tribes are unable to demonstrate that they exist within this
anachronistic fantasy—as both prior to Euro-American contact and after Euro-American contact.
Instead, petitioning tribes often appear as too similar or too assimilated (not different enough) to
American society and too different (not similar enough) from American society. Thus, the
Muwekma Ohlone Tribe and the United Houma Nation were both perceived as too assimilated
due to their close proximity—geographically, socially, and culturally—to American society and
non-Indians. These tribes also appeared as too different from the expectations of the federal
government in regards to political authority and governance. Informal, familial-based forms of
political organization do not legibly translate into western forms of governance—formal
governments with democratically elected leaders framed by a written constitution. This
difference was also witnessed in the federal government’s rejection of the United Houma
Nation’s oral traditions—oral accounts of history that were too different, as a basis of legitimate
evidence, from presumably objective, written forms of history. Ultimately, the Federal
Acknowledgment Process is premised upon the same old stories on American Indian people—an
eternal conflict between the past, resisting change, and the present, accepting such change.
The tribes themselves would like to tell an entirely different story. Compared to the
federal government, American Indian people are far more aware that their identity isn’t
necessarily predicated on an imposed liminality. The two sides of the liminal identity,
distinctiveness and intelligibility/assimilation, need not be opposites that vie for control. Instead,
both sides can exist harmoniously, not as an anachronism, but as a historical fact. American
Indians are indeed American and Indian—this dual citizenship, for most native people, is not
viewed as problematic (Biolsi 2005:251). It is, thus, perfectly sensible that the Seminole Tribe
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of Florida, perceived as one of the most “traditional” tribes, was the first tribe to pursue tribal
gaming and begin to accumulate wealth (Cattelino 2008:1). Likewise, it is possible for the Hopi
Indian Nation to creatively integrate Hopi traditions into a western-style judicial court system
(Richland 2008). The choice between entering the modern world and remaining in a mythical
past doesn’t need to be made. A tribe’s own sense of identity may merely be the self-evident
affirmation of its own history as well as its place in the modern world. This identity hardly
needs to be stated or spoken, for it is already known and recognized by the tribes themselves.
The Muwekma Ohlone Tribe continues to value the relationships between families and the
responsibilities towards the ancestors of these families. The United Houma Nation continues to
cherish its oral traditions over other historical accounts even when these oral traditions are
questioned by outsiders. Essentially, the issue, of the Federal Acknowledgment Process, lies in
the federal government’s non-recognition of these alternative and authentic tribal identities.
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